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MADRAS WAR REVIEW

A WEEKLY BULLETIN OF THE WORLD WAR

VOL V. FRIDAY, JULY 7, 1944 No. 44

Courage is of no use without Learning

GENERAL SIR CLAUDE AUCHINLECK

COURAGE and physical strength in an officer these days are not enough. An officer must have education as well, otherwise he cannot make himself efficient. If he is not efficient I cannot, and will not give men's lives into his hands, for our men are too good, and too precious to be wasted through faulty leadership

BUT do not forget that just as courage is of no use without learning, so also learning by itself without courage, physical fitness self-control, discipline and self-respect will never make a leader

I would like to say to you that in union lies strength. In a great country like India, and even in one Province of it such as the Punjab, there are many different kinds of people. All kinds go to make this world

IF this district, this Province and this country are to go forward, toleration and a spirit of give and take are needed and must be practised by all of us. We need all our strength if we are to win through and we should not waste it in quarrelling with each other

General Sir CLAUDE AUCHINLECK
Commander-in-Chief, India, in a speech
at the War Board Conference

CONTENTS

	PAGE.
Editorial—	
"G.C."	3
Cherbourg and Caen	4
Running Commentary—	
Assam Governor on his visit to Kohima: Enemy's chief objectives—Jap Commander's Order of the Day, etc.	5–7
Seshiah, the Curious Villager. (*By* R.G.)	7
Planning and Mounting the Assault	8–9, 12–14 & 16–17
War Diary	18 & 20
Gratefulness for gifts	19

[Note.—*The summary of news and comments contained in the* Madras War Review *generally relate to events and statements published till Wednesday, every week.*]

FOR FINAL VICTORY

"Though China is faced with unprecedented difficulties and danger, I am convinced that intensified Allied aid will enable China to win a final victory."

—Generalissimo CHIANG KAI-SHEK, *in a cable to* President ROOSEVELT *on the occasion of the American Independence Day, on Tuesday, July 4.*

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FESTIVAL OF FREE MEN

"The Independence Day is the festival of free men. The idealism of America, the power of her industry and the courage of her children, whose blood flows on the shores of Europe and Asia—all this is known to our nationals and respected by them. The people of France will observe the American Independence Day because the same will for independence has always united us in the days of darkness and the days of glory. May the traditional friendship, which links our two peoples and our two Republics, be inspired by these sentiments in future, as they have been in the past."

—General DE GUALLE, *in a message to the American people, on Tuesday, July 4.*

❖

ALREADY PROVED THEIR WORTH

"Indian ships and their crew have already proved their worth in this war. Men from the shores of India together with those whose homes are situated a thousand miles and more from the sea coasts, have come to learn the ways of the sea and how to ensure the safety of their homeland. India's naval forces have expanded to more than twenty times their strength in ships and men since 1939. Many new weapons have been introduced and new branches opened."

—Commodore A. R. CATTRAY, *in a speech, on Saturday, July 1.*

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"G. C."

A signal honour has been done to the Province of Madras—not in the power of an eminent official or a business magnate or a leader of a cause, nor by way of the by-yearly honors' lists themselves—but separately, and to Madrassi soldier of Viceroy's Commission rank.

According to the B.B.C., the first George Cross ever awarded to the Indian Army has been conferred, alas! posthumously, upon Subedar Subrahmanyam of Chingleput district. When first we heard the story of his magnificent self-sacrifice on that mountain road in Cassino we took the liberty of printing a letter to his father, Subedar-Major and Hon. Lt. Kannayiram expressing not only the gratification of this journal at the military recognition of his son's gallantry but also our admiration for the class which he adorned and which hitherto has received too scanty notice in the annals of the " Martial Races " of India.

To-day, not only Subedar Subrahmanyam's unsurpassed heroism, but also His Majesty the King's gracious recognition of it by this unique award, will give new heart to the lakhs of fine young men who have sallied out from this Province to do their duty by their history and their country. In this event the Madrassi soldier, in the generio sense, is vindicated, and while extending again our sympathy to the late Subedar's family we also congratulate them on his, and their, contribution to the lasting renown of the fighting man of the Province.

Our public will learn with approval that the Executive of the Governor's War Fund have made a grant of Rs. 5,000 to the hero's widow Srimathi Shanmughavalli Ammal ; that both the son and daughter of the late Subedar will receive educational concessions from Government, and that Government themselves, in recognition of the high distinction conferred on the late Subedar, are to bestow a grant of Rs. 7,500 upon his family. Perhaps most gratifying of all will be the personal telegram and letter sent by His Excellency the Governor to the late Subedar's widow congratulating her on the confirment of this honour and observing that not only does this afford well-deserved recognition of the late Subedar's heroism but also honours " the Presidency as a whole, whose military glory he did so much to revive."

CHERBOURG AND CAEN

THE Germans have suffered a heavy blow in the fall of Cherbourg, but German propaganda has been making attempts to minimize its importance. When the final attack on Cherbourg took place, Berlin began saying that it had only a "literary importance" for the defence plans of the German Command! That this is arrant nonsense is clear from the fact that though the loss of Cherbourg, by itself, would not bring about the collapse of the general enemy position in Normandy, its being in Allied hands would certainly serve the purpose of an invaluable supply base for the Allied armies, which is much better than getting supplies ashore on open beaches. Referring to the importance of Cherbourg, a Berlin broadcast said on June 23, "The fortress which was only a sea-fortress under the French army has been built up, during the last four years, into a formidable land bulwark as well by the German army. Its centre has a multiple ring of very strong installations built round it." When news reached Berlin that Cherbourg must be presumed lost, a spokesman of the German Ministry of Propaganda, in a home broadcast, declared that the defenders "fought until they had no ammunition left." But at the time this was regaled for consumption to the Germans at home, the German troops in Cherbourg were still putting up resistance!

"Ports decide success or failure."

NOW Berlin tells the world that the Allies cannot use the harbour for some time to come as the Germans have demolished it. Though it is true that harbour installations have been wrecked, the damage done will soon be dealt with by Allied engineers who have already shown, in the Mediterranean, their capacity for rapid rehabilitation of damaged ports. As it is, the Allies have already found themselves in possession of a deep water anchorage protected against weather. After the harbour is brought back into working order, the huge weight of Allied power will begin to be felt by the Germans. Referring to the advantage of such harbours, the German commentator Martin Hallensleben said on June 9, three days after the great assault from the west began, "If a combined preparation on the scale of the Anglo-U.S. invasion is to succeed, the quick capture of suitable sea ports is an essential condition. Ports decide success or failure for the side which is forced to bring men, supplies and materials across a sea, particularly as the present operation calls for large and spacious ports." Cherbourg is such a port.

IT may be asked why the Germans did not concentrate the full weight of their strength on retaining this great port. The answer is to be found in the fact that they were faced with a problem of choice between Cherbourg and Caen—and they chose the latter. It may again be emphasized here that the spectacular success of the American troops at Cherbourg was due, in a large measure, to the fact that British and Canadian troops did well the less dramatic but vitally important task of engaging in the Caen region, at a critical time, the most powerful elements of Field Marshal Rommel's forces. It was the drawing off and then holding the enemy's strength around Caen which strategically made possible the capture of Cherbourg by American troops.

Problem facing the Germans

COMMENTING on the fact of Germans being placed in a position of having to choose which place they would concentrate on defending and which they would let go after some stiff resistance, the military commentator of the London *Daily Mail* wrote on June 22, "This strategy is going to win the war for the Allies, for the problem which faces the Germans in Normandy faces them all over Europe. It is a problem that cannot be solved, for it means the employment of wasting efforts to meet ever-increasing liabilities." Now the Germans are concentrating on Caen, which is the central pivot of their defence strategy on the Allied left flank. Both the British and the Canadian forces are attacking in an area where Rommel has massed the bulk of his seven Panzer Divisions, after linking up on the high ground between Carpiquet, 3 miles west of Caen, and Verson, 2½ miles to the south.

THE Battle for Caen is now on in right earnest. Bitter fighting is raging. The Germans are fully conscious of what is in store for them, for if Caen follows Cherbourg, they would have to retreat some 20 miles to the south to another similar "hinge"!

LEBENSRAUM FOR UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTERS!



In a speech to the German people on the occasion of the funeral of General Dietl, Hitler described Dietl as a true and loyal friend and appealed to the Germans to give him the same unconditional support which Dietl gave him.

—*Specially drawn for the* MADRAS WAR REVIEW

RUNNING COMMENTARY

Assam Governor on his visit to Kohima

In a talk broadcast last week from the Calcutta station of the All-India Radio, His Excellency Sir ANDREW CLOW, Governor of Assam, who recently paid a visit to the Kohima battle front, declared, "British India can be regarded as liberated and our forces which were fighting in Kohima and the Naga Hills are well into Manipur State." Although there was a lot of fighting to be done before the Japanese were eliminated, His Excellency believed this to be the decisive battle of the only invasion there had been of the Indian soil since the Burmese Armies crossed this same frontier more than 100 years ago. If our forces had lost Kohima, the important communications in the Assam valley would have been threatened, and it would have taken a long campaign to recover the town, which would have created serious difficulties elsewhere. But this had happened quite differently, and the Kohima victory, His Excellency pointed out, "had been followed by rapid progress in clearing the road to the south, while other forces were moving on lines further east and getting astride Japanese lines of communication."

Sometime earlier Sir ANDREW CLOW recounted his impressions of the visit to Kohima in an interview to the 14th Army Observer. He told him, "Revisiting Kohima after the victory our forces have won there has been an inspiring experience. Everywhere there are signs of the hard struggle to evict the Japanese, but the line of battle has now been rolled so far away that the Nagas are bringing their women and children back to what is left of their homes." His Excellency observed that there was every reason for hoping that the Province of Assam would very shortly be clear of the enemy and that all our forces on this front would be free to concentrate on Manipur.

It was announced on Monday that the 14th Army troops have captured Ukhrul, an important key position in the Japanese defences. This was a nodal point of communications and base for administration and supply of the Japanese 15th Division, dominating the approaches from Imphal westwards and the way down to the Chindwin eastwards. With the fall of Ukhrul, it is pointed out, another part of the Japanese plan for the invasion of eastern India has crumbled.

Members of the Viceroy's Defence Council recently toured the Middle East, where they were given a warm welcome. Their visits to Indian units in the field and at bases were carried out with a freedum from formality which the troops very much appreciated.

Members meet an Officer Commanding an Indian Armoured Formation. Rao Bahadur N. Sivaraj, Member, National Defence Council, and Regional Leader (Depressed classes) of the National War Front, is seen in the extreme left.

Enemy's Chief objectives—Jap Commander's Order of the Day

It may be recalled that the chief objectives of the Japanese incursion into India were the capture of Imphal and the neutralization of General STILWELL'S threat to North Burma. If Imphal was captured the Allied threat to North Burma would have automatically been eliminated; for, the possession of Imphal would have given the Japanese control of the strategically important Manipur Road, and this would have enabled them to disorganize the communications through which supplies and reinforcements were carried to General STILWELL'S forces. Further, the capture of Imphal would form the acquisition of a forward base on Indian soil. The Japanese thought that, with the Allied air bases removed farther inland, they would be able to use their safely-established position in Burma to instigate internal trouble in India.

That on such lines were their thoughts running is clear from an Order of the Day issued by the Commander of the 15th Army to his troops 4 or 5 months ago. He said (Feb. 20, 1944):

"This operation will engage the attention of the whole world and is early awaited by a 100 million of our countrymen. By its very decisive nature, its success will have a profound effect on the course of the war, and may even lead to its conclusion. Our mission is thus of the greatest importance, and we must expend every energy and talent in the achievement of our goal."

The Japanese plan succeeded—only up to a certain point! They advanced with great speed, got astride of the Imphal-Kohima Road, came within reach of the Assam-Bengal Railway, and laid siege to Imphal, after cutting off all its routes of supply by land. They also temporarily held up the advance of General STILWELL'S forces in North Burma.

Tokyo's fantastic victories and ficticious annihilations

These temporary successes encouraged them to claim fantastic victories, and fictitious annihilations of our divisions. Tokyo claimed the capture of Kohima on March 30 and that of Imphal on April 6, and said: "The fall of Imphal has deprived General STILWELL'S forces of further reinforcements and supplies." Tokyo itself admitted that this claim was false by later saying: "The fall of Imphal is imminent." It was led into a further absurdity on May 27 when it said: "The surrender of Imphal is only a matter of time. The Allies have virtually to choose between unconditional surrender and complete annihilation."

The Japanese tried their very best to take what they had set their hearts on, but their failure to do so does not mean that there is not sufficient kick left in them to resume their attacks on the approaches to Imphal after regrouping their forces and replacing their casualties. But the magnitude of the Allied achievement consists in the fact that they have recovered the Imphal-Kohima Road and have continued their advance into North Burma. The capture of Kamaing and the break-through into Mogaung show the complete failure of the enemy to achieve anything.

Apart from the fighting quality of our troops, two other factors were responsible for this failure, namely, our air superiority and the part played by General LENTAIGNE'S Chindits. Our air supremacy kept our farflung forces supplied and kept up strategic and tactical bombing. As for the

GEORGE CROSS FOR LATE SUBEDAR SUBRAMANIAM

The first George Cross to be won by an Indian soldier has been awarded posthumously to Subedar Subramaniam, Madras Sappers and Miners, of Keelwotivackam village, Chingleput district, "for conspicuous gallantry in performing hazardous work in a very brave manner" in Italy. He already held the I.D.S.M. won in North Africa last year.

On February 24, Subramaniam was in charge of a mine-clearing company ordered to search for a missing Jamedar who was believed to have walked into a minefield near Mignane. Subramaniam was operating the mine detector when a small explosion occurred. Realizing that someone had trodden on an anti-personnel mine and that within four seconds, the canister would blow up into the air and explode, he rushed without the slightest hesitation towards the mine and flung himself on top of it, at the same time trying to knock his comrades aside. The force of the explosion was largely neutrallzed by the Subedar's body and six lives were saved as a result. The Subedar succumbed to his injuries.

"This act of unsurpassed bravery on the part of the Subedar, done in an instant without the excitement of battle, is beyond all praise," says General Sir Harold Alexander, who signs the citation. "The fact that he took this action and so deliberately gave his own life to save that of his friends, shows that Subedar Subramaniam possessed qualities of the highest order. His heroism was in accordance with the highest traditions of the Indian Army."

Chindits, they dealt a blow to the enemy's rear communicatione and advanced from behind, thus making it impossible to complete the encirclement of the Japanese forces. All this has been made possible by the co-operation of Americans, Chinese, British, Indian and tribal forces, fighting side by side as comrades in arms.

INDIAN AIR TRAINING CORPS, MADRAS UNIVERSITY THIRD PASSING OUT PARADE

A third batch of 30 Air Training Corps Cadets of the Madras University have completed their course. At a ceremonial parade on Tuesday morning the successful candidates were reviewed by group Captain Howard. Certificates of proficiency were awarded to the candidates, the best cadet of the course being E. N. Ramdoss from Trichinopoly.

The successful candidates who are recommended by the University authorities will go straight to the Officers' Selection Board for the Indian Air Force.

General Montgomery snapped in a mood of great satisfaction during a tour of visits to frontline troops in Normandy.

Major-General C.E.N. Lomax, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., Commander of the 26th Indian Division.

SESHIAH, THE CURIOUS VILLAGER

(*By* R.G.)

CANTO II—*Third Instalment*

"Good gracious!" said the Party man
"It is our democratic plan
To which it seems you now object.
How could the people's vote select
True leaders of this mighty nation?
We do not muddle in such fashion;
But, since when all is said and done
The Party and the folk are one,
We let the Party choose committees
To stand for Provinces and cities,
And these Committees choose a few
To vote; and these elect anew
Each several year the self-same band
To be the voice of our great land;
So what the Working Caucus cries,
However many say it lies,
Must be the people's very word,
Or else Democracy 's absurd."

"You jest, you jest" Seshiah had
Begun to say, "The joke's not bad- -"
"I do not jest" the other spoke,
"What I have said is not a joke."

"Why, if in fact you do not jest,
It is no joke, I too protest.
You claim us all to represent
But now you tell us what is meant
Is that we have no voice at all
In anything political.
A handful of you arrogate
All wisdom and all power, dictate
Like gimcrack Fuehrers, portly Duces,
To others, whom you treat like poochies.
In this great land of forty crores,
Not more than thirty lakhs are yours;
And looking closer at that lot
You find that twenty lakhs are not
Disposed to spin a charka daily,
Or entertain an outcaste gaily,
Or make an effort to appease
The strife of grim communities.

But one man joins because he fears
You'll bring his house about his ears;
Another, tired to death of babble,
Would rather buy the Party label
Than be from morn till evening hounded
And with your impudence confounded;
A third has heard you have a saint
To lead you, and his meek complaint
About the Tahsildar or Karnam
And other matters which concern him
Will get attended to when great
Sri So-and-so is chief of state.
Four annas is not much to pay
For being a sheep on Judgment Day;
And if salvation costs a groat,
And nothing more, who'd be a goat?
I know some very worthy souls
Who were, before you swept the polls,
Strong pillars of the other camp:
Rather than stay out in the damp
And watch you pinch the loaves and fishes
And other more luxurious dishes,
They pocketed their pride and all
Their principles political,
Paid down four annas and became
True bearers of your Party name!"

PLANNING AND MOUNTING

THE following sketch of some of the problems involved in the planning and organization which had to be carried out by the British General Staff and Administrative Staff before the landings in Western Europe could be undertaken is not to be regarded as a comprehensive or official record of this immense task involving, as it did, much work whose nature cannot yet be revealed. The picture which it tries to present is simply that seen by an individual officer of the War Department who had facilities for observing in some part the work performed by many branches of the staff—*quorum pars minima fuit*.

The story, it must be appreciated, is told exclusively from the angle of the British Army. The reader is asked to bear in mind throughout that the assault was conceived and organized essentially as a combined operation involving naval, land, and air forces, whose plans had to be closely integrated at every stage. Furthermore Allied forces, as well as British, were involved.

Much combined planning, both inter-service and inter-Allied, was therefore necessary, and to this aspect of the preparations for the attack brief but (it is hoped) sufficient reference is made.

This is an account whose aim is to convey some idea of the magnitude of the problems which had to be overcome, both in the general advance planning of the assault before the appointment of the Supreme Commander, and, more particularly, in the training, organization, and provision of maintenance for the British elements in the United Nations' liberation forces.

PLANNING THE ASSAULT

A. THE GENERAL STAFF SIDE

The great design for the landing in western Europe as an essential part in strategy aiming at the destruction of Germany's military power may be said in one sense to have been conceived at Dunkirk. From that day onwards a direct offensive against the enemy from the nearest, and therefore most advantageous, Allied base became the ultimate goal of all those whose responsibility it was to rebuild and re-equip the British Army, and to plan the eventual course of military operations against Germany.

For over a year after Dunkirk the patent disparity between the British Army's resources in men and material compared with those of the enemy made the study of offensive operations against the Continent little more than an academic exercise. At the time of the evacuation there was only one fully equipped division in Great Britain; except for the veterans of the campaign in France, the training of British troops was far from complete, and the immediate necessity was to reconstitute in Britain formations capable of coping with the threat (which then seemed a probability) of an attempted invasion of Britain by the enemy. Moreover, apart from defensive needs at home, means had to be found for securing against enemy attack the vital link in the British Commonwealth's communications represented by Egypt and the Suez Canal. Men and material from Britain, India, South Africa and the Antipodes had to be found first for General Wavell's victorious campaign in East Africa and Libya during the winter of 1940–41; then, in April 1941, substantial military assistance had to be sent to Greece; and in the summer of that year the necessity of forestalling enemy threats to Syria and Iran involved a further call upon Britain's still limited resources. Finally, large reinforcements had to be sent from Britain to the Middle East for the second Libyan campaign which began under General Auchinleck against the now greatly strengthened Axis forces in North Africa in November 1941. In short, during the twelve months which followed Dunkirk, the conception of a British return to the Continent in armed force appeared to be receding from the realm even of long-range practicability.

BRITAIN GAINS ALLIES

Two major developments in 1941, however, radically altered the long-term strategic picture which the planning staffs had to consider. First, in June, came the German offensive against the U.S.S.R.—an event which meant that a large part (and, as events proved, a major part) of Germany's land forces would no longer be available to oppose landings in the West. The second new factor was the entry of the United States into the World War after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7.

On a short view the extension of the war to the Far East brought about by Japanese aggression was not conducive to preparations for a western European offensive. The defensive campaign which had to be waged in Malaya and Burma called for urgent (though, unhappily, unavailing) reinforcements from the United Kingdom to the slender garrisons on the spot; later, the frontiers of India had to be strengthened by British forces, and Japanese conquests in the South-west Pacific necessitated the diversion from the European theatre of Australian forces which would otherwise have been available for the campaign against Germany.

On the other hand, taking a longer view, the entry of the United States into the war imported a factor without which decisive operations against Germany in western Europe seemed likely to remain in the sphere of wishful thought. That is, in the planned expansion of the United States Army there came potentially into being an Allied strategic reserve, on whose basis, it was felt, preliminary planning for a western European campaign could begin. In the closing days of 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces (then General Sir Bernard Paget), the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command (then Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas) and Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, then Chief of Combined Operations, were charged by the British Chiefs of Staff with the task of working out, as joint commanders, plans for operations designed, within the limits of practicability, to draw off German forces from the Eastern front, and eventually to recreate for Germany the threat which the German High Command had always dreaded—the two-front war.

PRELIMINARY STUDY

At this stage of General Staff planning, much careful and valuable work was done during 1942 in the examination of all the many factors which should influence the choice of areas in which lodgment could be effected, having regard to the potentialities and requirements of land, air and sea forces. The more, however, that the available resources in men and materials for the assault, build-up and maintenance were studied, the more irresistible did the conclusion become that, though bridgeheads might be secured, there was inadequate assurance that they could be maintained against counter-attack by major enemy forces, or, still less, that lodgments could be exploited sufficiently to have any worthwhile impact on the course of the war. In midsummer, following the conference between the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt at Washington, it was decided that, having regard to then available Allied resources, it would be strategically sounder and more profitable to give priority to operations in the Mediterranean—a conclusion reinforced by the new threat to Egypt which had been created by Rommel's counter-attack and advance as far as El Alamein in the early summer of that year.

The consequent reinforcement of the British Eighth Army for the victorious offensive which began under General Montgomery at El Alamein in October 1942, and the simultaneous despatch of the British First Army in conjunction with the United States Second Corps to French North Africa, inevitably meant a lengthy deferment of the

THE ASSAULT

project for operations in the West. Nevertheless, the preliminary planning which had been done under the aegis of the joint commanders (with whom Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on the naval side and the commander of the United States Army in Europe had now been associated) was far from wasted. It was at this time obviously impossible to make detailed operational or administrative plans: Sufficiently precise information of the enemy's probable strength in the West on dates far ahead, or of exact shipping resources which could in the event be allotted to the operation was still lacking. Tactically, however, much had been learnt by minor raiding attacks which had previously been mounted by the Chief of Combined Operations, and much more was learnt by the larger scale combined operations at St. Nazaire in March 1942, and at Dieppe in August of that year. In addition, the operations against Madagascar in April 1942 and the landing in North Africa in November of that year, though they did not present anything like the problems involved in a landing on Western Europe opposed by German troops, furnished valuable material for the more detailed working-out of administrative plans in the way of assembly and maintenance of expeditionary forces.

Furthermore, an immense amount of information had been collected by the Intelligence Staffs regarding the West wall, its defences and the topography further inland. Much work had also been done on the preparation of the necessary maps for operations on the Continent. The immensity of the work involved may be judged from the fact that many millions sheets of maps had to be produced covering all parts of Western Europe likely to be involved in the operations. In meeting this demand the Survey Department of the War Office had to employ practically every firm in Britain whose plant was suitable for map printing. Elaborate steps, moreover, had to be taken to ensure that no individual draughtsman or printer was aware whether or not he was dealing with a zone selected for attack.

By the end of 1942 it may in fact be said that though many tactical, administrative and technical "snags" were still destined to emerge, the British General Staff had a clear picture of the basic factors which must be considered in any proposed landings in Western Europe. In particular, the problems both of assault and maintenance complicated by the tide factor in offensives which might have to be sustained for a considerable period across beaches, led to the conclusion that for a combined operation on a scale unprecedented in history, against coasts which the enemy had had years to fortify, it would be necessary to provide in immense numbers special landing craft and other naval weapons and equipment, including troop-carrying aircraft; and, further, that the very substantial assault forces required must be organized and trained to a degree in which no army had ever been trained for a task in which familiarity with equipment and repeated rehearsals would alone offer assurance of adequate mobility in assault and follow-up.

At the Casablanca Conference early in 1943 it was decided to give first priority to clearing the Mediterranean Sea Route, and endeavouring, by operations against Sicily and the Italian mainland, to knock Italy out of the war. It was clear that our existing resources in specialised landing craft would be largely absorbed by these operations. It is pertinent to recall that at that time the toll taken by enemy U-boats in sinkings of Allied shipping was still sufficiently serious to place a limitation upon the ship-building facilities which could be made available for such specialised landing craft. It was, therefore, recognized that the opening of operations in the west would have to be deferred until 1944. It was, however, decided that active preparations should be commenced forthwith, and that a firm plan should be made as soon as possible.

PLANS TAKE SHAPE

As a result of these decisions a new chapter in the preparation for the opening of operations began at the end of March 1943; a British General Officer, with a General of the United States Army as his Deputy, was appointed Chief of Staff to a future Supreme Allied Commander. He was provided with a planning staff consisting of both British and American officers of all three Services (Navy, Army, Air), was given a forecast of the resources that would be available early in 1944, and was instructed to submit plans for effecting lodgments on the Continent in certain conditions.

As has been shown, this new Headquarters did not start from scratch. It had already to its hand a very considerable mass of preliminary planning material prepared by the staffs of the joint commanders and could count on having available not only a considerable force of British, Canadian and United States troops for the assault, but the promise of additional forces to exploit lodgments once made.

The first task of the combined staff was to select the most advantageous areas in which to effect a lodgment. This was a question of achieving a correct balance of advantage from the points of view of Naval and Air protection and of capacity of the available beaches and ports. The next task was to decide on the relative size of the assault, follow-up and build-up formations that could be organized with the resources, particularly in a landing craft and transport aircraft, given in the forecast. Consideration had also to be given to the physical capacity both of Britain as a concentration base and of British ports of embarkation, for, though the *potential* combined Allied resources in men and material could be regarded as almost infinite, these capacities, as well as the available numbers of assault craft, placed certain limits on the size of the assault forces which can be allocated for any one landing.

The plan, as evolved, was submitted to and closely scrutinized by the British and United States Chiefs of Staff and was finally approved by the Prime Minister and the President at the Quebec Conference in August 1943. After that, the Chief of Staff was instructed to proceed with active preparations for the implementation of the plan pending the appointment of the Supreme Commander. One of his first tasks was to convert his Planning Staff into a fully integrated operational and administrative headquarters for the Supreme Commander, when appointed. This was accomplished by the end of the year. In the meantime, active administrative preparations in conformity with the approved plan were accelerated, and much work was done in connection with the training of the forces, the co-ordination of supporting action by Air and Naval forces prior to and on "D" day and the development of the offensive after beachheads had been secured.

TACTICS FOR ASSAULT

An assault on an enemy-held coast differs from an offensive against enemy positions in a land theatre in that the assaulting troops arrive in the face of the enemy in abnormal, bunched, tactical formations imposed on them by the vessels in which they are carried. Further the attack cannot be preceded by the normal artillery preparation. In consequence, craft must be designed to give the best possible deployment on the beach and means must be devised to replace the fire support which the assaulting troops cannot themselves provide.

The tactical problem grows more complex as the size of the assaulting force increases. An Infantry Battalion can be transported in a simple type of landing craft from which troops can wade ashore, but their transport cannot be so landed, nor can tanks, or artillery. Hence the evolution of the manifold types of special landing craft and landing ships designed for the transport of infantry, tanks, vehicles, guns and stores. Differing widely in size these crafts—in whose design the Admiralty and Combined Operations Headquarters collaborated—had all a common functional purpose, namely, the most rapid deployment of assault force and of its supporting weapons and material.

(Continued on page 12)

PREPARATIONS FOR INVASION



A long line of British troops coming aboard an infantry landing craft at an English port.



Sherman tanks and equipment stowed aboard a tank landing craft at a south coast port in preparation for their journey across the channel to France.

Tanks and equipment being unloaded on the beaches. Note the British waterproof wading equipment on the leading tank. A high proportion of British and American tanks are fitted with such equipment.



Part of the Royal Air Force air armada before it set off for the French coast on the evening of June 6.



Transport of a famous British Division being loaded aboard Liberty ships.



Picture shows *where children once played, ammunition is now stacked among bluebells in a wood.*

SCENES FROM SECOND FRONT

Members of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service have arrived in Normandy. A truck load on the way to their station.



Allied chiefs meet aboard H.M.S. Apollo *off the invasion beaches. General Eisenhower (Centre), Admiral Ramsay* (Left) *and General Montgomery* (Right).



Refuelling some of the first R.A.F. Spitfires *to land in Normandy.*

The Deputy Supreme Commander Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay in a "Duck" watching Allied aircraft over the assault area during their visit to the Normandy beaches.



Normandy beach clogged with British Forces' equipment.

British Commandoes resting on the Normandy beach.

(Continued from page 9)

For an operation dependent upon the effective use of assault craft, equally specialized training of the assault forces was essential. During 1941 and 1942 a number of Training Centres had been established for the training of forces taking part in raids and in such operations as the landings in North Africa and Madagascar. But it became abundantly clear to the Combined Staff, early in the summer of 1943, while the plan was still being prepared, that much more would be needed for European operations. In consequence, and with the active co-operation of the civil authorities, a number of special Training Centres, for the use of both British and American forces, were organized on the coasts of Britain, involving the clearance of many square miles of populated countryside so that live ammunition could be used by Navy, Army and Air in combined exercises. Here higher training on the Battalion, Brigade and Divisional basis was carried out to supplement the initial basic training given at the old Combined Training Centres.

It was not merely assaulting infantry who had to be rehearsed in their tactics and made familiar with the use of many special weapons, which have been developed—a "Back-Room" story which cannot yet be told. In the various Training Centres R.E. personnel found replicas of every known defensive device used by the enemy and practised their destruction, learning in their turn the use of equipment whose nature at this stage cannot be described. Similarly Signal Units were rehearsing in the improvisation of the most satisfactory communication nets for a beach landing, while drivers of tanks and supply vehicles became practised in methods of embarkation and in driving vehicles from assault craft on to the beach. Finally, all the tactical problems involved in so loading craft that men and material could disembark at the right time and in the right tactical order on the beach had to be worked out and the lessons learnt in the Mediterranean and Pacific mastered.

Pari passu with the training of sea-borne assault forces the training of British Air-borne Forces, both parachutists and glider-borne brigades proceeded intensively. Apart, moreover, from the organization of Air-borne Formations with their specialized weapons and methods of supply, much work had to be done in devising and perfecting means of co-ordinating on the army's side the necessary link between the ground forces and air support.

THE SUPREME COMMANDER

The plan elaborated by the Combined Staff was naturally subject to final revision and approval by General Eisenhower, who assumed in January 1944, the appointment of Supreme Commander. A further examination was then carried out to check and revise the original forecast of resources made in 1943.

On this final firm basis the Army Staffs of various levels, right down to units, worked out their detailed plans in collaboration with corresponding Naval and Air Staffs. It was during these last few months that the final intricate co-ordination of action by all three services was completed down to the last detail.

It remained for the Supreme Commander to make the final decision as to the precise date of the assault and to give the word to set in motion the whole intricate machinery which had been built up during the preceding years, some idea of which is contained in the following account of the administrative side of the plan.

B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SIDE

The layman might easily suppose that in an operation such as the assault on Western Europe the Administrative Staff are brought into the picture only after the General Staff, under the direction of the Force Commander, have worked out in more or less final form the plans of attack. Actually, as has already been indicated, this is not so. In the planning of the operation, even in the earliest, most tentative stages, intimate contact between the General Staff and the Administrative Staff was essential in order that strategic and tactical intentions might be tested step by step by the yard-stick of administrative feasability.

Not only so. Years ago, when European operation was still an optimistic idea rather than a definite project, the staffs responsible for the availability of "material" in the widest sense, had to plan designs and arrange provisional demands on production schedules. Weapons, and equipment, transport, ammunition, food and petrol were all fields in which long pre-estimation of the needs was necessary, while plans had to be devised, far ahead, by the Transportation Branch, whose responsibility it would be to rehabilitate port and railway communications in the rear of the attacking forces.

With this in mind, let it now be assumed that the operational plan has taken provisional shape. That is to say, the General Staff are now in a position to answer the three questions on which the Administrative Staff must base their own planning. These three questions are: Where? When? and In what numbers? It is for the Administrative Staff to supply the answers, from a multiplicity of angles, to the further question: How?

The first stage in administrative planning for the actual operation was the "Q" appreciation—that is, a study dealing with all the movement and maintenance problems involved in the plan of attack. This is prepared by the Movements and Operations Branches of the Quarter-Master General's Staff. In relation to a projected operation, these Branches are responsible for co-ordinating the various activities of "Movements" of Supply and Transport, and of the Provisioning Branches of the various arms and services, which have to be fitted into the master plan.

SPEED AND REGULARITY

The object which the Administrative Staff had to keep in mind may be stated in simple terms. It was to place the assaulting force in a position to attack the enemy and to ensure the synchronization of its impact on the enemy with a smooth flow of supporting reinforcements of men and material. The attainment of this object—assuming that supplies of weapons, ammunition, vehicles and food have been organized in advance, together with the requisite shipping tonnage for an amphibious operation—involved a task of planning and organizing which falls into four phases:—

(i) Formations must be concentrated in an area reasonably adjacent to the points at which they are to embark for the overseas theatre. This area must be cleared to some extent of its normal military population.

(ii) The concentrated troops must then be moved into marshalling areas, where they are divided into assault troops, first reinforcements and follow-up "residues" and then split into unit parties and craft loads for embarkation.

(iii) The assault flight, with the "follow-up" wave and a steady increment of "build-up" reinforcements on their heels must be transported by sea to the target area.

(iv) The force which secures the bridgehead must be sustained by a maintenance flow of ammunition, supplies and stores of all kinds. In relation to each of these phases, the essence of administrative planning was to secure an even regularity of movement and to avoid bottlenecks; and this, in turn, depended upon foresight and organization, in relation both to the capacity of the beach-head—complicated in Western Europe by the magnitude of tides—and the rate of "lift" which could be attained, having regard to shipping tonnage available and both railway and loading facilities in the United Kingdom base.

For example, faulty calculations might lead to an awkward bottleneck if more troops or supplies arrived off-shore than could be disembarked within the period planned for their unloading. Such a development would obviously throw out of gear the estimated speed of shipping "turn-round", on which the build-up of the Force depends. Similarly, the planned rate of flow of personnel to embarkation points must be regulated to conform precisely with the readiness of craft on which to embark. Again, the flow of reinforcements, both men and material, a break in whose smoothness might jeopardise the very existence of a landing force, is conditional upon "marrying" exactly the

projected numbers of troops or tonnage with the rolling-stock and harbour berths at 'Movements' disposal. It must be remembered, too, that in all shipping plans provision had to be made for estimated return movement of casualties, prisoners of war or refugees.

As an illustration of the need for absolute accuracy in planning and execution on the administrative side, it might be pointed out that the unforeseen addition of 50 men to a particular rail movement might mean the addition of an extra coach to the planned train; that this addition might make the trainload too great for the locomotive's capacity; and that, in consequence, the time-table of a whole series of connected rail and shipping movements might be thrown out of gear.

MAINTENANCE THE CRUX

Before, going, however, into the arrangements which have to be made for the concentration, marshalling and embarkation of the assault and following forces, it may be convenient to consider at this point in somewhat greater detail the crucial problem of maintenance after the first objective of the assaulting forces—the capture of a beach-head—has been achieved. It is on the successful implementation of maintenance plans—subject, as they are, to every imaginable kind of interference from acts of God and the King's enemies—that the operation, on the administrative side, really depends; and these plans began to be executed long before the assault force was concentrated for its task.

In relation to maintenance, the first need is to predict, in the light of past experience, what the probable needs of a numerically expanding force are likely to be, within a period of, say, seven days, having regard to the estimated nature of the operations, in terms both of projected rate of movement and expected intensity of fighting. This estimate, upon whose soundness much depends, is made in the first intance by the branches of the Force Commander's staff concerned with provisioning the various arms of the service. They have before them, as a firm basis for calculation, the numbers of men, tanks, guns and vehicles which it is hoped to land day by day; but though ration requirements (i.e., food) are a relatively simple calculation, estimation of the probable expenditure of ammunition and consumption of petrol involves highly expert judgment, and the minimum requirements in the way of Ordnance replacements and spares of all kinds, and of such engineering stores as, say, bringing material, call for a very exact appraisement both of probable enemy resistance and of the nature of the terrain. Still more difficult, and subject to even more incalculable factors, is the task, which has next to be performed, of estimating requirements for, say, the next two or three weeks. But this estimation in advance is essential to enable the various branches of the Quarter-Master General's staff of the War Office to organize the complex movement of supplies, ammunition and stores from United Kingdom depots to the fighting men in the bridgehead.

SEA TRANSPORT

Acceptance, of course, of the provisional estimates by the Expeditionary Force of requirements for the first two phases of the operation depends upon the availability of shipping of the requisite types. In considering the planning which had to be done by the "Movements" Branch of the Quarter-Master General's staff (in intimate association with the Ministry of War Transport) before the shipping factor in the supply equation could be finally "fixed", it is necessary to go back a long way in time. First, a decision had to be taken in the light of the preliminary "Q" Appreciation as to which types of shipping, other than the special assault vessels operating under the White Ensign, would be required both for the conveyance of "follow-up" and "build-up" personnel, and for the transport of maintenance supplies and stores. The conclusion was soon reached that for the assault stages of the attack it would be necessary to rely predominantly on coastal shipping. That is, vessels would have to be employed whose draught would enable them to get as close in shore as possible, and whose size would not make them unduly vulnerable to attack by enemy aircraft, submarines, or surface vessels.

This decision taken, two questions had next to be examined. First, what proportion of the total coastal shipping in this country could be taken up for the operation without either placing an intolerable burden on internal rail transport, or depriving essential services, such as river-side power stations, of necessary supplies of coal? Secondly—again having regard both to the minimum needs of civil industries and services geared to the war effort and to naval requirements—how many loading berths could be made available and to what extent could the existing availability of berths be supplemented by the construction of special "hards" or other improvised berthing facilities on the coast? Finding the answer to this question involved a long and meticulous reconnaissance both of ports and beaches.

Next, loading facilities having been provisionally ascertained, plans had to be marked out in detail for the movement of coastal ships, after requisitioning, to the selected ports and other points of loading. Factors which had to be borne in mind at this stage of planning were that small coastal ships have widely different ranges of voyage practicable without refuelling, and very different draughts, both when empty and when loaded with commodities of different types. Moreover, in the "marrying" of ship and port, a further complication was that Allied Continental shipping, which formed a considerable proportion of the available fleet, had so far as possible, for administrative reasons, to be concentrated in single ports, rather than be widely dispersed, for loading.

The positioning and routeing of the fleet provisionally fixed, the final work of planning which had to be perfected might be described as an interpretation of the fleet's gross tonnage in terms of potential discharging capacity at the beachhead. It must be remembered that two ships of the same tonnage will often have very different dead-weight capacities, varying according to the ship's construction, and type of hold and deck space in its design. Not until many elaborate calculations had been made, checked and re-checked, was it possible to arrive at an approximate figure of the numbers of men and tonnage of stores which could be brought to the vicinity of the bridgehead on the heels of the assault, while the rate of discharge to the beach depended upon a further factor—the varying capacity from the ship to shore of D.U.K.Ws. and the "dumb" and power-operated barges which also had to be procured and adapted in advance for landing purposes.

Simultaneously, of course, with the planning outlined above, long-range plans for the direction and movement of ocean-going shipping, affecting routes all over the world, had to be made—remembering always that, even during the peak of the assault, Britain's general war imports must be maintained and the needs of American forces provided for. As these plans, however, related to the future progress of the campaign rather than the initial stages of attack, and as the planning and executive authority (once the relevant military data had been provided) was the Ministry of War Transport, they fall outside the scope of this story.

FROM DEPOT TO SHIP

When shipping and beach capacity for the first stages of the assault was balanced against the estimated maintenance requirements of the Force, some adjustments between the two had naturally to be made, and these in turn sometimes required revision of the original apportionment between different kinds of supplies and stores. When eventually the various branches of the staff of the Force were given a firm allocation of tonnage available on a sequence of dates for their special requirements, they notified the War Office Branches responsible for the provisioning of their particular arm of the service, specifying the quantities of different categories of supplies which should make up their tonnage allocation. The Provisioning Branches, having ascertained what the loading ports were to be, then decided which depots were to meet the requirements.

After that, the organizational task reverted to the Quarter-Master General's Branch: that is, movements had to plan the exact time-table and routeing which stores should adhere to in their passage from depot to loading port. This aspect of administrative planning involves in the first instance the building-up of skeleton time-tables for use between every depot and every port. These, when filled in, give details of the depot, times of special trains' departure from the depot and arrival at the port, the code number of these trains, the maximum number of wagons each can pull, and the route by which the journey is to be accomplished. The immensity of the organization required can be judged from the fact that for the mounting of the

landing of the First Army's expedition to North Africa over 1,000 special trains had to be provided in this country, as well as over 15,000 additional wagons on regular freight trains.

Stores for maintenance in the first phase of the operation were naturally pre-loaded, the shipping being dispersed as a precaution against enemy attack in many ports. At this point complex administrative problems arise. Not merely are the cargoes destined for disembarkation at a number of different points in the bridgehead or bridgeheads, but, for the first few days of the assault, when numbers of fighting men, guns and vehicles are increasing as rapidly as possible and the volume of maintenance shipping is subject to certain limitations, it is vitally important that the flow of supplies should be evenly balanced as between different categories. That is to say, a situation must not arise in which on one day nothing but ammunition arrives, so that the troops remain hungry; nor will the operation work smoothly if on the next day there is a glut of rations but an acute shortage of, say, materials which the Royal Engineers require to overcome tactically important obstacles.

Hence, for the early phases of the maintenance of the bridgehead, every ship had to be loaded with a mixed cargo—so much food, so much ammunition, so much signals equipment, so many engineering and ordnance stores, and so much water and medical supplies, not forgetting the fact that the Army is responsible for transporting for the Royal Air Force materials needed at any airfields captured or constructed. Furthermore, in planning the arrival at the bridgehead of various ordnance and engineering stores, priority had to be determined in relation to the degree of importance of tasks foreseen.

Finally, an additional factor which the administrative planners had to bear in mind was that the vessels employed would inevitably not all be of the same capacity. Thus, though three vessels might begin unloading at the same time, the cargo in the last hold of vessel No. 1 might be ashore a day or more before the unloading of vessel No. 3 was complete, so that if allowance were not made for this factor, the evenly balanced inflow of supplies of different categories would be dislocated.

Bearing always in mind that an adequate margin for loss by accident or enemy action has to be provided, it will be seen that even on broad lines the task of organizing the pre-loading of maintenance shipping for the first phase of a sea-borne attack is complex. In detail, it calls for an immensely elaborate organization. A single pre-loaded ship may include many hundreds of categories of different sorts of supplies and stores. Originally these would be assembled in a multiplicity of specialized depots; hence, many months before the assault it was found to be advisable to pre-stock carefully sited depots, organized on what be termed a "Departmental Store" basis, covering the widest possible range of essentials. Thus the complexity of rail and road movement was to some extent reduced. Even so, however, the cargo for one relatively small pre-loaded ship might emanate from, perhaps, 20 different "departmentalized" depots in the United Kingdom.

Crated in accordance with a packaging technique perfected by the experience of nearly five years of war, the supplies duly moved from depot to loading port, some by train, others by road. As loading proceeded, it was often found that last minute modifications to the plan were required, since it is practically impossible to foresee with precise exactitude how many packages of different shapes and sizes and weights, say 500 tons, will go into a particular ship of that theoretical capacity! Thus, particular stores, shut out from one ship, might have to be rushed to another ship in a different port.

So much for pre-loading of planned maintenance. For the second phase of the operation the organization of supplies and their movement from depot to port also had to begin long before the first of the assault troops set foot on enemy soil. After that, though volume of traffic grows, and places an increasing strain on transport, the problem is simpler in that, gradually, uniform cargoes can be loaded, and eventually daily shipments will depend upon periodic notifications from the force of its requirements.

THE FORCES MATERIAL NEEDS

After this sketch of the general framework within which the detailed planning for the maintenance of the assault Force had to be worked out, it may be convenient next to consider the various material requirements whose provision had to be arranged for and whose movement had to be co-ordinated. Responsibility in this field—excluding the R.A.M.C.'s province—is divided between the Supply and Transport Branch, Ordnance and the Provisioning Branch of the Royal Engineers. The first-named branch is responsible for seeing that the force receives not merely food and water, but also the petrol to enable it to move and fight. The Ordnance Corps and the Royal Engineers' Provisioning Branches between them cope with all the other material needs of a fighting force except medical supplies.

The immense problem of the general procurement and co-ordination of food supplies for the British Army, whether located at home or in its many overseas theatres, falls outside this story. It is also impossible to deal here with the part played by the Ministry of Food through the Merchant Navy in conveying food from all quarters of the globe, and in balancing the needs of the civilian population with military requirements greatly increased (in terms of United Nations' "food strategy") by the despatch of large United States Forces to Western Europe. The intention of the following paragraphs is to indicate briefly the nature of the special planning and advance organization which had to be carried out to meet the particular needs of an opposed landing in western Europe.

In connection with any operation starting from Britain and involving the deployment of a force in a theatre overseas, the Supply and Transport Branch of the staff has to plan and organize the provision of the R.A.S.C. supply units which will eventually form the link between the base port across the sea and the soldier in the front line. These units include port organizations concerned with the unloading of vessels, the base supply depots and their forward distributing depots up the lines of communication, together with field bakeries and butcheries and their vehicles. The scale on which these units must be planned depends obviously on the size of the force, and whether the projected theatre can reasonably be relied upon to provide both water and such foodstuffs as fresh vegetables and potatoes.

The procurement of the bulk supplies which will eventually flow into this mechanism overseas, the building-up of reserve depots from which they will be drawn in Britain, and the advance notification to movements of the tonnage for which rail, road and water transport will be required—all this involves long-range planning of meticulous accuracy. In particular, it must be borne in mind that whereas reserve depots of ammunition and other ordnance and engineering stores can be built up over a long period with simple safeguards against deterioration by weather, many bulk foodstuffs are definitely perishable goods, so that the turnover and replenishment of stocks must be arranged for to prevent wastage.

So much for the long-range planning required for the eventual maintenance of a force overseas in respect of rations in addition to which, it should be appreciated, the Supply and Transport Branch is also responsible for the provision of those hospital supplies which give sick or wounded men suitable "comforts" in their diet. In the case, however, of opposed landings, involving the deployment of large forces, and their maintenance for possibly a considerable period over beaches, a factor which the Supply and Transport Branch had to reckon with in their arrangements is that, particularly in the early phases of the operation, it would be essential, to conserve shipping space and to devote as much dead-weight capacity as possible to the conveyance of personnel, fighting vehicles, weapons, ammunition and special operational equipment. Field bakeries, the butcheries, with their cold storage plants, and the field kitchens which units must take forward with them if bulk supplies are to be converted into satisfying daily menus, are bulky and require much shipping space. Hence, for the present assault, to an infinitely greater extent than that necessitated by any earlier overseas operation in this war, it was realized by the Supply and Transport Branch that, for a considerable period, maintenance of the force across the seas must depend upon types of rations economical in shipping and vehicle space, and involving the minimum of cooking. To meet such operational needs much thought and experiment had been put into designing different forms of packed rations, regard being had both to their nutritional value and to their immunity

(Continued on page 16)

ALLIED LANDINGS IN NORMANDY

The scene at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Press Conference at the Ministry of Information when Lieutenant-General Whiteley released the communique to the Press telling them about the landings.



A photograph taken from the air of a part of the huge Armada as the gigantic fleet of warships, transports, landing craft and supply ships awaited the signal which launched the assault for the liberation of Europe.

A scene on the beach as the troops proceed inland.

The first German prisoners-of-war from the beachhead in a Prisoners-of-war Camp.

(*Continued from page* 14)

from damage in the peculiarly difficult conditions accompanying and immediately following beach assaults.

SPECIAL RATION PACKS

Here it may be useful to interpose a brief description of the different types of ration packs which will figure as mute dramatis personae in this story of the supply arrangements for the attacking force.

First comes the 24-hour ration pack. This is designed specially for the day of the assault, and is issued separately to each man together with a Tommy cooker and its patent fuel. It has a high calorific value (4,000 calories), though its gross weight, in a waxed cardboard container, is less than 2¼ lb. It comprises pressed blocks of pre-cooked dehydrated meat and of rolled oats with sugar and fats, together with a compressed block of tea, sugar and milk powder. (The meat and oatmeal blocks can be gnawed dry if water is not available.) Other ingredients are chocolate, boiled sweets, chewing gum, sugar tablets and meat extract cubes.

Then, there is the composite pack, familiarly known as the Compo. Made up in seven different types, the Compo pack comprises different assortments of canned meat, fish, vegetables and fruit, jam and margarine, sweets and chocolate, biscuits and cheese, tea-sugar-milk powder, salt, cigarettes, matches and soap. Having a gross weight of about 64 lb., it provided one day's ration for 14 men with a calorific value of 3,590 calories per man per day. Somewhat similar in composition, but made up in two, three or five men packs according to the size of tank crews is the reserve ration pack carried in armoured fighting vehicles for emergencies.

Next, there is self-heating soup and cocoa, brought rapidly to boiling point by igniting chemicals in a tube-shaped cylinder within the tin; and, finally, the "Bag" ration, which consists of sweet biscuits, chocolate and chewing gum—the first two commodities to be consumed by troops while waiting for embarkation, the last designed as a remedy for sea-sickness.

In the making of the Compo pack on which, except for the first stages of the assault, the Expeditionary Forces, will rely until (it may be many weeks ahead) utilization of bulk supplies can be organized, it will be appreciated that heavy demands on the tin-plate industry were involved—one instance of the help which the civilian population have given by self-denial to the assault.

MEALS FOR THE ASSAULT

With these types of ration in mind, we can proceed to a brief review of the more detailed supply planning which had to be put in hand when the operation's administrative project had definitely crystallized. This planning falls logically into four phases—the concentration, the marshalling, the sea passage, and the maintenance of a force in a bridgehead.

The plan adopted for the feeding of the force in the concentration area was that units should draw and cook their own rations in the normal manner, supplies being obtained from depots in the various Home Commands concerned. Though, however, the total number of troops which had to be supplied in the United Kingdom was not affected by concentration, the re-distribution in the location of divisions and other formations involved considerable problems. For example, special trains for the conveyance of potatoes from certain areas had to be arranged for to cope with the increased demands of certain Home Commands. Special arrangements for the supply of meat had also to be made with the Ministry of Food. By the time concentration was complete, all formations had also to be supplied by Command depots with a pre-determined number of days' Compo rations to be carried in their vehicles, first or second line.

The next supply arrangements which had to be organized were the provision of rations to be specially cooked and supplied to troops during their stay in the marshalling area—the period of stay being estimated to vary from hours to a considerable number of days. In the marshalling area all troops were to be issued with their landing rations, consisting of two 24-hour rations, complete with Tommy cooker, a normal emergency ration, a tin of 20 cigarettes, and a water-sterilizing outfit. They had also to be issued with the "Bag" ration for consumption during the move to the embarkation point or while awaiting to embark.

Next, plans had to be made and implemented for victualling the assault craft and "follow-up" ships, other than those for which the Navy or the Ministry of War Transport would be responsible. Two sets of rations had to be placed on board, those to be consumed during the passage (careful allowance having been made for unforeseen delays) and those consisting of a reserve ration to be touched only in case of emergency.

Finally, the pre-loading of rations and hospital supplies on the general principles already described for the maintenance of a force in a bridgehead had to be fitted, with the demands of other arms and services, into the general "Movement" picture. As Supply Reserve depots of food are normally less specialized—i.e., more comprehensive in their range of stocks—than those of Ordnance, or the Royal Engineers, special "invasion" depots did not need to be organized in quite the same way but in view of the strain which it was foreseen there would be on rail transport immediately before and during the early stages of the attack, plans had to be worked out whereby, through a careful selection of depots, rail movements could be reduced and simplified.

The part played by Home Commands in implementing the plans in relation to concentration and marshalling areas is reviewed in later paragraphs. To assist Commands in that task, however, special supply detachments had to be organized and lent both to marshalling areas and to personnel embarkation points. Other R.A.S.C. detachments had to be located, at the many ports in which maintenance supplies were to be loaded, in order to ensure that no hitches occurred and that, so far as is humanly possible, no oversight or omission should lead to a fighting man going into action hungry.

WHEELED TRANSPORT

Though it is still as axiomatic as it was in Wellington's day that an Army marches on its stomach, the magnitude of the role now played by mechanical transport in the maintenance of armies is sufficiently well-known to need little fresh emphasis. The design and planning of the Army's road transport services are cared for, like the supply of food, by the Supply and Transport Branch of the War Office in conjunction with the R.A.O.C. In terms of vehicles, few branches were required to begin at an earlier date their planning for the landings.

In the first place, even in relation to what might be termed normal supply vehicles, the production programmes had to be settled and put in hand years before the attacking force was finally assembled with all its transport. Not merely was it necessary for the Supply and Transport Branch to make long-range provisional, but forecasts of the numerical strength of the force which might be employed, since different types of supply vehicles are more suitable for one country than another, it became necessary (long before the decision as to the target areas of the assault was taken) to make provision, in planning demands on production programmes, for the more likely eventualities.

A further problem which had to be solved was that involved in the decision (taken for reasons already described) to use small coasters predominantly in the maintenance of the bridgehead for a considerable period. This decision, with its inevitable reaction on the availability of internal rail transport both for service and civilian needs, meant that great dependance must be placed on inland road transport for the conveyance of supplies to loading ports before and during the progress of the landings.

Years ago, it was foreseen by the Supply and Transport Branch that the policy (whose soundness no one questioned) of economizing in the consumption of petrol by concentrating freight traffic so far as possible on the railways, even for short journeys, might result in such a curtailment of civilian road industry that this industry would not have the necessary resilience to cope with the sudden added strain of assault needs. In collaboration, therefore, with the Ministry of War Transport, steps had to be taken long in advance to safeguard against such an eventuality without the adoption of measures which would result in uneconomic petrol consumption. It became, in short, one of the Army's responsibilities to try to ensure that the civil road industry would be able to play its part in the maintenance of the attack in circumstances in which it would be necessary to concentrate military vehicles to an increasing extent on the actual movement of the Expeditionary Force, with its supply train, overseas.

Finally the question arose of foreseeing the special types of vehicle which would be required for this particular operation, and of developing their design and production. Certain vehicles, such as the tank transporter, may be said to have been developed primarily for use in the campaign in North Africa,

but Western European eventualities were even in this case also prominently in mind. The vehicle, however, which has place of honour in the special provisions made by the Supply and Transport Branch for operations in Western Europe is the D.U.K.W., that is, the amphibious lorry, whose function it is to transport personnel and supplies from ship to shore and to convert itself instantly on reaching the beach into a land vehicle. The use made in operations against Sicily and the Italian mainland of a considerable fleet of D.U.K.W.'s was essentially a rehearsal for an assault on a much larger scale against the West of Europe—the purpose to which they owe their original conception.

For the manning of D.U.K.W.'s extensive water-training of R.A.S.C. personnel was necessary, while special motor boat companies operating fast launches had to be organized for work in connexion both with beach and port unloading. In addition, like all unit drivers, the drivers of normal R.A.S.C. supply vehicles had to have systematic instructions in manœuvring lorries through comparatively deep water from assault craft. Finally, in connexion with the operations of airborne divisions, the task fell to the Supply and Transport Branch of organizing and training special teams for the expert work of stowing, and ejecting from aircraft, supplies needed for the maintenance of troops engaged in airborne assault.

"JUICE"

In the maintenance both of fighting and supply vehicles—to say nothing of special equipment vehicles and of the amphibious D.U.K.W.'s and other ferry craft—the provision of petrol, oil, and lubricants is an essential element for which the Supply and Transport Branch of the War Office is also responsible. As in the case of food and road transport services, the operational planning for assault had to be interpreted at an early stage of planning in terms of P.O.L. requirements, which, even in the early phases of the operation, may represent over one-third of maintenance tonnage. Between bulk reserves, moreover, held in the United Kingdom and the fighting and other vehicles operating in the bridgehead, an elaborate chain of organization had to be planned and made ready by the Supply and Transport Branch.

First, a forecast had to be made of requirements in petrol containers, not merely for the assault, but for a considerable period thereafter. Means would probably not exist at first of landing bulk supplies direct from ship to lodgment areas. Consequently, reliance would have to be placed on packed P.O.L. For this purpose, so far as petrol is concerned, it was decided that the staple means of conveyance in the early stages of the assault (so far as the final stage of transport up to units is concerned) in all stages of operations, should be the 4½ gallon Jerrican—a model based on the container used by Rommel's Army in North Africa.

The next step in the planning of P.O.L. supplies for the assault consisted in the selection, very many months ago, of sites for reserve depots of pre-packed containers in the United Kingdom, factors governing their selection being accessibility to the designated loading ports and suitability from the point of view of protection against enemy air attack. Of the many depots built up by the Supply and Transport Branch for this purpose some have a capacity considerably exceeding 30,000 tons of packed containers.

Then came the planning of the supplies immediately required by the attacking forces. For the early phases of the operations, P.O.L. had to be preloaded, like other supplies, in accordance with the previously agreed estimate of requirements. But in the case of P.O.L., the Supply and Transport Branch also had to devise means whereby D.U.K.W.'s and ferry craft plying between ship and shore should be assured of adequate supplies of fuel and lubricants.

The picture of organization, planning and training in this field requires to be completed by a brief reference to the creation of special R.A.S.C. petrol units, whose duties range from the filling of containers to their repair from the driving and maintenance of the bulk petrol vehicles (which in due course replace the Jerrican in the rearward areas of a theatre of operations) to the conveyance of oil from ocean-going tanker to shore and the operation and maintenance of bulk installations and reserve depots.

"WARLIKE" AND ENGINEERING STORES

The next main category of the Force's material needs which has to be considered is the immense range of "Warlike Stores" which come within the purview of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps. These include not merely ammunition of all types, but stocks of clothing and accoutrements, Signals equipment, certain Royal Engineering stores, replacement tanks, guns and other weapons, together with a multitude of spares required for the maintenance and repair both of "fighting" and other vehicles. The total range of Ordnance stores held in this country runs into more than half a million different items—a figure sufficient to illustrate the complexity of the organization required in building up the chain of supply between the Ordnance depot in the United Kingdom and the individual fighting man on vehicle in the front line.

It would be inappropriate here to attempt to give a complete picture of the Ordnance organization planned for the various stages of the overseas lines of communication which it is hoped eventually to establish. This is a story which can well be kept for later telling. So far as the initial phase of the assault on Western Europe is concerned, the immediate task of Ordnance was two-fold. On the one hand, special "invasion" depots, together with transit depots, had to be organized from which to draw, both for pre-loaded "build-up" craft and for the immediate needs of the assault brigades, those items from the encyclopædic Ordnance list which, it was judged, would be operationally essential for opposed landings.

This done, and the flow of Ordnance stores to loading ports organized in accordance with a Movements time-table, the next task was to devise and equip a special organization to operate as a "first flight" of maintenance on the beaches. This organization takes the form of the Ordnance Beach Detachment, whose task it is to deal with what is known as the assault Force's "Landing Reserve." This consists of specially prepared boxes of stores which can be easily handled over beaches and contain estimated essentials, i.e., weapons and parts of war equipment which units must be able to rely upon during the initial assault.

As the bridgehead grows in size, the "Landing Reserve" is gradually built up into a wider range of Ordnance stores, entitled a "Beach Maintenance Pack." Thereafter the development of the projected Ordnance supply chain depends upon the course taken by operations.

A further point of organization required for the initial assault was to ensure that every unit and formation would be aware of precisely what Ordnance stores would arrive in beach-heads at various stages, so that transport should not be sent back from fighting units on fruitless errands.

The provision of certain stores is the responsibility of the Royal Engineers and not of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps. These mainly comprise either stores of engineers' origin used by other arms—for example, crawler tractors (bulldozers)—or heavy constructional engineering machinery and transportation material, such as, lighters, cranes and rolling stock. The organization planned by the Royal Engineers for the despatch and unloading of these stores resembles that already described in the case of Ordnance.

THE R.A.M.C.'s PART

The picture of the Services which cater for the needs of the assault Force would not be complete without reference to the plans which had to be made by the Army Medical Department for dealing with casualties.

It does not fall within the scope of this account to describe the eventual elaborate organization planned for the evacuation of casualties when the extent of liberated territory becomes sufficient to permit the establishment in the overseas base of General Hospitals, with its normal "forward" system, going up, through Casualty Clearing Stations, Divisional Field Dressing Stations to Advance Dressing Stations, Casualty Clearing Posts and Regimental Aid Posts. For this organization much planning and pre-arrangement of equipment and transport by air, road, rail and sea, was necessitated, while numerous hospitals in Britain had to be cleared, so far as it was deemed necessary of civilian patients in order to meet estimated military needs.

(To be continued)

WAR DIARY

BRITAIN AND GERMANY

28TH JUNE.—There was considerable German air activity during the day.

Flying bomb installations in Pas de Calais and Paris area were attacked by Allied aircraft.

"A considerable number of launching sites for flying bombs have been located and destroyed" declared Sir Archibald Sinclair, Minister of Air, in the Commons to-day. Sir Fredrick Pile, Commander-in-Chief of the Anti-aircraft Command also made a statement.

Allied bombers attacked Saarbrucken.

29TH JUNE.—German flying bombs continued to attack places in Southern England.

About 2,000 Allied planes attacked four aircraft factories, one synthetic oil refinery and a number of other military and industrial targets in Central Germany.

30TH JUNE.—Flying bombs came over Southern England and caused damage and casualties. Royal Air Force heavy bombers continued their attack against flying bomb installations in Northern France.

Mr. Churchill made a six-hour tour of anti-aircraft gun sites.

1ST JULY.—Flying bombs were again over Southern England and caused damages and casualties. Allied aircraft attacked flying bomb installations in Northern France.

2ND JULY.—The Germans sent flying bombs over Southern England. Casualties and damages were reported. Flying bomb installations in Northern France were attacked. Mr. Churchill will make a statement on the flying bombs this week.

Hitler spoke on the occasion of the funeral of General Dietl.

3RD JULY.—Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, returned to England.

A record weight of well over 56,000 tons of bombs were dropped during June on targets in Germany and occupied territory by Royal Air Force.

4TH JULY.—Pilotless planes activity over Southern England was on a considerably reduced scale to-day.

Allied bombers attacked objectives in Ruhr.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE ATLANTIC

28TH JUNE.—United States Army and Navy Forces and merchant marine shipping overseas received reverse lend-lease in excess of 500,000,000 dollars from the British Commonwealth of Nations during the first three months of 1944.

29TH JUNE.—The United States Under-Secretary of War, Mr. Edward Stettinius said that Britain had agreed to the establishment of a new haven for war refugees in Lybia.

30TH JUNE.—The World Monetary Conference began at Brettonwoods (New Hampshire) with representatives of 44 United and Associated Nations.



Provisional sectional drawing of a German flying bomb.

President Roosevelt signed legislation pledging the United States to the Japs from the Philippines and to grant the Islands their full independence as soon as normal Government functions can be restored. The legislation permits the United States to acquire air, land and naval bases in the Philippines.

3RD JULY.—The United States Vice-President, Mr. Henry A. Wallace left China.

* * *

INDIA, BURMA AND CEYLON

28TH JUNE.—In Myitkyina, the Chinese took another strong point in the southern sector of the town. They also captured Namti, six miles north-east of Mogaung.

The Flag Officer Commanding the Royal Indian Navy, Vice-Admiral Godfrey was received by His Majesty the King at Buckingham Palace.

29TH JUNE.—In the Myitkyina area, the Chinese destroyed several strong points.

30TH JUNE.—Chinese troops advanced in the south sector of Myitkyina. Air and ground action to dislodge Jap remnants in east of the Kohima-Imphal road was in progress.

Direct land communications between India and China is expected to be re-opened shortly. Chinese forces on the Myitkyina front and those on Salween front are now only 64 miles apart.

1ST JULY.—Allied troops captured Sareikhong, 20 miles north-west of Imphal.

2ND JULY.—Allied troops were within 4 miles of Ukhrul.

3RD JULY.—Allied 14th Army columns continued to press towards Ukhrul. A series of attacks in the Myitkyina area were repulsed.

It is estimated that about 17,000 Japs were killed in North Burma campaign in the last eight months and 10,000 square miles of territory wrested from Japs.

4TH JULY.—The 14th Army troops captured *Ukhrul*.

LAST MONTH . . .—

1ST JUNE.—Allied forces took Malakawng.

4TH JUNE.—Allied troops entered Rome.

6TH JUNE.—Second Front begun.

8TH JUNE.—Allied Army captured Bayeux.

12TH JUNE.—Americans took Carentan.

15TH JUNE.—Allied bombers attacked Japan.

16TH JUNE.—His Majesty visited Normandy.

17TH JUNE.—Allies landed in Elba.

20TH JUNE.—Russian troops captured Viborg.

21ST JUNE.—Big Naval battle raged in Central Pacific.

25TH JUNE.—Americans captured Cherbourg.

26TH JUNE.—The Red Army captured Vitebsk and Zhlobin.

27TH JUNE.—Mogaung completely in Allied hands.

28TH JUNE.—Soviet troops captured Mogilev.

29TH JUNE.—Russian forces captured Bobruisk.

30TH JUNE.—The World Monetary conference began at Brettonwoods.

RUSSIA AND FINLAND

28TH JUNE.—The Russians captured *Mogilev*, Sokolov, Bykhov, Lepel, Osipovichi and other places.

The Finnish Government officially announced last night that Germany had promised all armed help needed by the

(*Continued on page 20*)

GRATEFULNESS FOR GIFTS

WE give below excerpts from a few of the letters received by the Honorary Secretary, Joint War Charities Supply Depot, Government House, Madras, from Madrassi Units serving in other parts of India and overseas. They show how much the gifts sent from Madras are appreciated by men away from home.

A German tank knocked out by a British anti-tank gun near Bayeux. Cr. 9326.
(Radioed from London to Cairo and flown to India.)

FROM A MADRAS SAPPERS AND MINERS UNIT:

"The sweets have been issued out to the various platoons and have been greatly appreciated by the men, as they seldom receive sweets in such quantities. It is a comfort to them to know that they are being constantly in the minds of people from their own country."

FROM A MADRASSI ENGINEERS BATTALION:

"On a recent visit to Madras one of my officers called on you at the Joint War Charities Supply Depot. He has just returned and brought with him the 50,000 cigarettes, foodstuffs, sports goods, clippers, books, etc., which you so kindly gave him for distribution to the men of this Battalion.

In asking Capt. Henney to try to purchase sports goods, etc., of which we are very badly in need as they are quite unobtainable here, I had no idea that the Madras War Fund would so generously supply them free.

It is, indeed, most generous and I can assure you that your gift is most deeply appreciated by all ranks of the Battalion, who already, in 1942, were the recipients of similar gifts from your Fund."

FROM A UNIT OF MADRAS ENGINEERS:

"I am writing to express the most grateful thanks of this Unit for the receipt of the 500 writing pads and 200 lb. curry powder which the Governor's War Fund has so generously sent this Battalion.

I have distributed the writing pads and these work out to one per two men. In view of the very great shortage of writing paper at present available, I would like you to know how very greatly this gift is appreciated by all Indian Ranks who spend a large proportion of their spare time in writing home.

As regards the curry powder, the situation as regards rations of condiment powder has improved since December, but the curry powder that you have sent seems to be of a much better quality than anything we receive in rations. I am keeping the whole consignment as a reserve for any future feast days or to use in the event of any further deficiency in rations.

Will you please accept and pass on to all concerned the most grateful thanks from all Indian Ranks of this Battalion for this most generous gift?"

FROM AN M.T. CENTRE:

"Yesterday five large packages were delivered to my centre together with a no charge invoice No. 3182, dated 13th June 1944. The goods have been checked and agree with the items on the invoice.

It is difficult for me to express the feeling of Southern India troops in this part of India when they receive the types of amenities to which they are accustomed in the south. It is difficult also to pass on to you their feelings when they know that the people from their own districts are thinking of them in such manner as to provide this type of facilities for them to enjoy themselves away from their homes. Will you please convey to the members of the committee and all those responsible for the organization of which you are the Honorary Secretary, my sincere thanks on behalf of all the Madrassi classes in this Centre for the gifts which have so generously been made."

FROM A MADRAS SAPPERS AND MINERS TRAINING BATTALION:

"To-day my unit received from you a very lavish gift of amenities. That they will be appreciated by my Sappers goes without saying, for they are all games which are in great demand.

On their behalf and on my own behalf I wish to thank you and all those people whose subscription have helped to make these gifts."

This yarn is by Walter Winchell, the famous American columnist :—

American airmen who have been bombing Germany are a little tired of the sameness of German *communiqués*. They've cooked up this one for Dr. Gœbbels : "A huge swarm of American and British bombers, intent on their usual mission of bombing hospitals and churches in the Reich, was intercepted and completely destroyed to-day by a small number of German fighter planes. Springing to the defence of helpless civilians the *Luftwaffe* pilots shot down more than 300 of the giant attacking planes, and let the remaining fifty so badly injured that they were unable to return to their bases.

"None of our gallant German planes or pilots was injured.

"One of our cities is missing."

(*Continued from page* 18)

Finns for them to continue the war against Russia. It is stated that Nazi troops have entered Helsinki, the capital of Finland.

29TH JUNE.—General Zhakharov's troops in White Russia captured *Bobruisk*, *Petrozavodsk*, the capital of the Karelian-Finnish Republic and many other places.

It is announced that in the fighting in the third White Russian Front, Soviet Army has killed 33,000 Germans and taken 20,000 prisoners.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull declared that the question of a possible break in the Finnish-American relations was being considered.

30TH JUNE.—Soviet troops captured Vetrino, Desna and other localities.

The United States broke off diplomatic relations with Finland.

1ST JULY.—The Russian troops captured *Borisov* and crossed river Beresina at several points.

It is revealed that the Commander of the German Army in Finland, General Dietl died.

2ND JULY.—The Soviet forces cut German communications from Minsk to Brest-Litovsk and Luuinetos. Russians captured Kovschinza and Plissa and Slutsk, Krasnoze, Vilekya.

German troops occupied Aaland Islands.

3RD JULY.—The Soviet army captured the capital of White Russia, *Minsk*.

The Red Army troops captured Glubokoye, Dokshitsy and over 400 other localities.

4TH JULY.—The Russian forces captured *Polotsk* and some other places. A new all-out Russian offensive was launched on the Karelian Isthumus.

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ITALY, AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

28TH JUNE.—The Allied troops captured Montieri, San Vincenze, Sasseta, Chiusina, Gioiella and Porto.

29TH JUNE.—The Allied troops captured *Castagneto*, Monticiano, Lafoce, Fratta Vechchia, etc.

30TH JUNE.—Forces of the Fifth Army captured Castiglione Del Lago and Monte Pulciano.

1ST JULY.—Troops of the Fifth Army reached the outskirts of Cecina and they were only 6 miles from Siena. Florence had been declared an open city.

2ND JULY.—The Fifth Army troops occupied Cocina. The Eighth Army Forces occupied Forrita di Siena, Monte Techio, Valfabbrica, Macerata and Recanati.

3RD JULY.—Allied troops captured *Siena*, Oriono, Sinalunga, Fojano, Nocera, Osino, and Loreto and Lucignano.

Mr. Henry Stimson, United States Secretary for War, landed in Italy.

Colonel General Von Mackensen, Commander of the 14th German Army has been removed from his command.

4TH JULY.—The Allied troops captured Lucignano, Monte Varno, Cortona, Severin and Matelica.

* * *

VICHY, FREE FRANCE AND THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

28TH JUNE.—The Allies captured Tourville. The Allied troops crossed river Odon. Heavy fighting continued around Caen. Allied air attacks on enemy objectives in France continued. The Vichy Minister of Propaganda M. Henriot was assasinated in Paris last night.

29TH JUNE.—Allied troops captured Tessel, Bretteville, Menanoir, Grainville and Mondrainville. There was heavy fighting north of Caen. American troops launched an attack in the direction of St. Lo. Fresh landings were made in Normandy east of Orne and occupied Cabourg.

It is revealed that General Eisenhower held an important conference this week at which Mr. Churchill and all Second Front Commanders were present.

A lend-lease agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Polish Government was signed to-day.

30TH JUNE.—Allied hold on the crossings of river Odon was strengthened. Americans launched an offensive against Contentin Peninsula. North of Caen Allied troops achieved local gains.

Germany was negotiating a new agreement with the Vichy Government. The French Cabinet met to discuss important matters.

1ST JULY.—Allied troops strengthened their positions on both flanks of the Odon river. All enemy attempts to break in were frustrated in the Caen-Evrecy sector.

2ND JULY.—Rommel kept up continuous counter-attacks against the Tilly-Caen salient but they were all repelled. It is reported that Allies have taken 42,000 prisoners.

Allied bombers attacked Budapest.

3RD JULY.—American troops opened a new offensive along a front of more than 20 miles in the West Coast of Normandy. British forces occupied Bretteville.

There is serious trouble in Denmark due to strikes. Budapest in Hungary and objectives in Rumania were bombed.

3RD JULY.—Four weeks after the invasion the Allies hold a bridge-head of 1,100 square miles running for 125 miles along the coastline of Normandy and 111 miles along the zig-zag front and extending to 22 miles inland at its greatest depth. Enemy casualties is estimated to be one lakh.

4TH JULY.—American troops captured St. Jores and St. Ramy de Landes. Canadian forces captured Caripquet, 3 miles west of Caen. British troops captured Verson.

United States' bombers attacked a number of German aerodromes in France.

* * *

THE FAR EAST

28TH JUNE.—Most of the southern part of the Japanese Islands including Tokyo are now within the range of American fleet operations according to a statement made by Mr. James Forrestal, United States Secretary of the Navy.

American bombers attacked Takao in Formosa Island.

29TH JUNE.—It is announced that Australian troops have occupied the whole of the Hansa Bay area, in New Guinea. United States troops continued to advance in Saipan.

30TH JUNE.—American forces advanced beyond Mount Tapotchan in Saipan. Allied troops penetrated deep into Jap territory north of Magicienne Bay.

1ST JULY.—Allied planes attacked Tinian and Rota. During June 247 Jap aircraft 5 destroyers, 14 merchantmen and 95 barges were destroyed in South-West Pacific.

2ND JULY.—Jap positions in Dilli, New Britain and New Guinea were bombed by the Allied bombers. Americans pressed forward along the entire front on Saipan Island.

3RD JULY.—Allied aircraft attacked Bokroe island.

4TH JULY.—It is revealed that American forces landed on Noemfoor Island on Sunday and captured Kamiri aerodrome and also Garapan, capital of Saipan in South-west Pacific. Allied aircraft attacked Chichijima in Bonin Island and Iwojima in Volcano Islands.

FOR YOUR RADIO DIARY

MADRAS—JULY	8.—9-45 p.m.	'Fighting Forces.'
" "	10.—9-00 p.m.	Radio Blitzkrieg—An Analysis of Enemy Propaganda—By Rao Sahib A. Gopalaswami.
" "	11.—9-45 p.m.	Topical Talk.
" "	12.—9-45 p.m.	'The Voice of America'—Relay from Delhi
" "	13.—9-00 p.m.	A Continent in Revolt—Norway.
" "	14.—9-45 p.m.	World Affairs—Relay from London.
" "	15.—" For the Fighting Forces."	

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